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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, Tropical Depression Twelve formed 
near Nassau in the Bahamas.1  Six days later, the storm made landfall in 
southeastern Louisiana as Hurricane Katrina, a category four hurricane 
with sustained winds up to 135 miles per hour.2  New Orleans Mayor C. 
Ray Nagin issued a voluntary evacuation on Saturday, August 27, followed 
by a mandatory evacuation order the following day.3  Eighty percent of 
the New Orleans population heeded these evacuation orders prior to 
Hurricane Katrina’s arrival, but as many as 100,000 remained.4  Those 
who remained behind, through choice or lack of available transportation, 
rode out the storm in their neighborhoods or designated refuges.5
Hurricane Katrina left massive destruction in its wake: over one 
thousand dead,6 over $35 billion in insured property damage,7 and over 
$60 billion appropriated by Congress for rebuilding efforts.8  The size 
 1. Oversight Hearing on NOAA Hurricane Forecasting Before the H. Select 
Comm. for Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong. 8 (2005) (written testimony of Max 
Mayfield, Director, Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center), available at 
http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/Testimony/mayfieldhouse92205.pdf [hereinafter Oversight 
Hearing].  A tropical depression is a storm that forms over a tropical ocean with a core 
warmer than the surrounding atmosphere and fastest sustained surface winds of less than 
thirty-nine miles per hour.  BOB SHEETS & JACK WILLIAMS, HURRICANE WATCH 319 
(2001). 
 2. Oversight Hearing, supra note 1, at 12.  The Saffir-Simpson scale categorizes 
hurricanes on a scale of one to five, with five being the most severe.  See SHEETS & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 319.  Wind speed is the determining factor in the scale, 
which is used to estimate potential property damage and flooding expected along the 
coast from a hurricane landfall. The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale, http://www. 
nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). 
 3. Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy].  Nagin 
initially directed his staff to issue a mandatory evacuation order on Saturday, but debates 
over whether to exempt hospitals delayed the order until Sunday.  Eric Lipton, White 
House Knew of Levee’s Failure on Night of Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at A1 
[hereinafter Lipton, Levee’s Failure]. 
 4. Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1. 
 5. Black or African Americans constitute 67.3% of the New Orleans population, 
according to the 2000 census.  U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (follow links to Louisiana then New 
Orleans).  Over one-quarter of the population lives below the poverty line.  Id. 
 6. CNN.com, Katrina’s Official Death Toll Tops 1,000, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2005/US/09/21/katrina.impact/ (last visited July 15, 2006). 
 7. H.R. Res. 477, 109th Cong. (2005).  Recent figures estimate the damage at 
$81.2 billion, making it the costliest hurricane in U.S. history.  Hurricane Katrina, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricanekatrina (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). 
 8. Congress initially provided $10.5 billion for Hurricane Katrina relief in a bill 
which President Bush signed into law on September 2, 2005.  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs Arising from the Consequences of 
Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-61, 119 Stat. 1988.  President Bush immediately 
requested an additional $51.8 billion.  Congress provided this additional funding through 
a second bill that President Bush signed into law on September 8, 2005.  Second 
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and scope of Hurricane Katrina’s wreckage prompted a national 
response.  A major disaster or state of emergency was declared in forty-
six of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.9  Former Presidents 
Clinton and George H.W. Bush spearheaded a private fundraising effort, 
and communities throughout the country opened their homes and wallets 
to support the relief effort. 
In contrast to the commendable outpouring of support by individuals, 
domestic and worldwide, the initial response from the federal, state, and 
local governments was roundly criticized.  Media coverage excoriated 
officials from President George W. Bush and then-Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Director Michael Brown, to Louisiana Governor 
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco and New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin.10  
Criticisms focused on the uncoordinated response, raising questions about 
national emergency preparedness in a post-September 11th context.11
The colossal size and scope of wreckage should not overshadow the 
immeasurable losses sustained on an individual level by Katrina victims.  
Nevertheless, the United States has mechanisms in place to cope with 
the long-term impacts of Hurricane Katrina.  Public officials announced 
their commitment to rebuild communities destroyed in the Gulf coast 
region.12  The political process can hold decisionmakers accountable for 
their shortcomings.13  Congressional investigations are bringing to light 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs Arising from 
the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, 119 Stat. 1990. 
 9. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 2005 Federal Disaster Declarations, 
http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2005 (last visited July 15, 2006).  Major 
disaster declarations were issued as a direct result of Katrina’s impact in Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.  Id.  Katrina’s direct impact also resulted in a state of 
emergency declaration for Arkansas and Texas.  Id.  The remaining emergency declarations 
arose from evacuation efforts.  Only Alaska, Hawaii, Vermont, and Wyoming did not request 
emergency assistance as a result of Katrina.  Id.  The difference between major disasters 
and emergencies is discussed infra, Part III.B., text accompanying notes 117-19. 
 10. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Scott Shane, Ex-FEMA Chief Tells of 
Frustration and Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A1; Jennifer Steinhauer & Eric 
Lipton, FEMA, Slow to the Rescue, Now Stumbles in Aid Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2005, at A1. 
 11. E.g., Who’s in Charge?, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2005, at A20; Philip Shenon, 
Commission Criticizes Storm Response, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A23. 
 12. For example, President Bush stated that efforts to rebuild the Gulf Coast region 
would be “one of the largest reconstruction efforts the world has ever seen.”  President 
George W. Bush, Address from Jackson Square (Sept. 15, 2005), www.whitehouse. 
gov/news/releases/2005/09/; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Pledges Federal Role in 
Rebuilding Gulf Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 13. President Bush’s approval ratings dropped to 41% in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina, the lowest level his presidency had seen at the time.  James G. Lakely, Bush’s 




lessons learned from this tragedy.   Aid programs will assist victims in 
piecing their lives and families back together. 
14
A separate question, however, is whether these mechanisms are 
sufficient in light of the admittedly inadequate initial response.15  For 
many Katrina victims, these ex post systems do not address the injuries 
suffered at the peak of the crisis.  One of the most alarming images from 
Katrina’s aftermath depicted displaced victims unable to receive emergency 
food and water supplies.16
This Comment contends that judicial review should be available to 
Katrina victims whose injuries arose from failure to receive emergency 
food supplies.  Reviewing the liability landscape in its entirety would 
require investigation of laws, regulations, and plans on the federal, state, 
and municipal levels.17  Instead, this Comment focuses specifically on 
claims that New Orleans residents might pursue against the federal 
government for its failure to provide adequate food.18
Part II discusses the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a jurisdictional 
bar to claims against the government.  It reviews the English common 
law history of sovereign immunity before analyzing the doctrine’s 
application in the American legal regime.  Part II pays particular attention to 
the “discretionary function” exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
and federal disaster relief legislation. 
Approval At Lowest Level Yet, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Sept. 16, 2005, at A14, available at 
http://washingtontimes.com/ (search long term archives for the article title).  FEMA 
Director Michael Brown was forced to resign his post.  Peter Eisler & Mimi Hall, New 
FEMA Chief Takes Center Stage After Years in Wings, USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2005, at 
A2, available at http://usatoday.com (search for the article title).  While public opinion 
of Brown plummeted, former FEMA director James Lee Witt’s reputation soared.  See 
Leslie Wayne & Glen Justice, FEMA Leader Under Clinton Makes It Pay, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 10, 2005, at A1. 
 14. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-396 (2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ 
congress/house/katrina/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). 
 15. Bush Admits Katrina Response Was Inadequate, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 16, 
2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/16/europe/web.0915kat1.php 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2006). 
 16. Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1. 
 17. For an exploration of issues surrounding the relationship between federal and 
state governments responding to catastrophic public health emergencies, see Michael 
Greenberger, The Role of the Federal Government in Response to Catastrophic Health 
Emergencies: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, 
Research Paper No. 2005-52 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf? 
abstractid=824184 (download from links at the bottom of the page). 
 18. This Comment also notes possible claims Hurricane Katrina victims might 
bring alleging discrimination on the part of the federal government in providing disaster 
assistance.  See infra notes 127, 183.  Nonpartisan polls showed that “[t]wo-thirds of 
African-Americans said the government’s response to [Hurricane Katrina] would have 
been faster if most of the victims had been white, while 77 percent of whites disagreed.”  
Elisabeth Bumiller, Gulf Coast Isn’t the Only Thing Left in Tatters; Bush’s Status with 
Blacks Takes a Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at A17. 
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Part III describes the development and growth of federal disaster 
relief.  It focuses on the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act,19 the 
legislation which drives federal disaster relief, and specifically on 
provisions regarding food commodities20 and federal government liability.21 
Part IV examines how the doctrine of sovereign immunity interacts 
with the Stafford Act.  Issues of proof are not addressed because 
sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional question.  Instead, tentative lines 
of argument are sketched to address whether the federal government 
may be held liable for failing to provide adequate food supplies for 
victims in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
Part V discusses two potential vehicles for recovery: a victims’ 
compensation fund similar to that created for the victims of the 
September 11th World Trade Center attacks,22 and a class action.  Assuming 
Hurricane Katrina victims’ claims overcome the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, Part V recommends that Hurricane Katrina victims seek 
recovery through class action litigation due to the problems inherent in a 
victims’ compensation fund and the efficiency gains made possible by a 
class action. 
This Comment is not intended to heap further blame on public 
officials.  Political recriminations remain properly with the respective 
actors in the political arena.  Rather, this Comment concerns itself with 
the legal implications of the federal government’s response—whether 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the government from liability 
for failing to provide adequate food. 
II.  SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides a jurisdictional bar to 
suits brought against the government.  Originating in English law, 
sovereign immunity was subsequently infused into the American legal 
regime.  Legislation in the twentieth century waived sovereign immunity 
for certain claims, most notably through the Federal Tort Claims Act 
 19. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 
(2000). 
 20. Id. § 5180 (food commodities). 
 21. Id. § 5148 (liability of the government).  The Stafford Act also prohibits 
discrimination in providing disaster relief.  See id. § 5151. 
 22. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101, provided incentives to channel tort claims to the Fund.  
Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed 
Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2003). 




(FTCA).23  The FTCA partially retains sovereign immunity through a 
variety of exceptions.  Most relevant for present purposes is the “discretionary 
function” exception, which shields the government from liability for 
policy-driven decisions of government agents.24  Federal disaster relief 
legislation contains a similar exception.  25
To successfully pursue claims against the federal government, New 
Orleans’s Hurricane Katrina victims must first establish that sovereign 
immunity does not bar them.  The following discussion outlines the origins 
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, its application in American law, 
and the retention of sovereign immunity via the discretionary function 
exception. 
A. Roots in English Common Law 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity stemmed from the “necessary and 
fundamental” principle of the English Constitution that “the king can do 
no wrong.”26  By this principle, the King could not be held personally 
liable for any injury arising from the conduct of public affairs, though 
his ministers could be held accountable for such conduct.27  Nor could 
the King be held liable for any personal injuries suffered by individual 
citizens.28  The distance between the sovereign and his subjects made it 
unlikely that the King would come in contact with an ordinary subject; 
the law extended this into a blanket immunity for private injuries.29
The King could do the people no harm because the royal prerogative 
was created to serve their best interests.30  Moreover, the King could not 
be commanded by a higher authority—“for who shall command the 
king?”—without infringing the dignity and sovereignty of the royal 
person.31  Subjects could inform the King of their injury, however, at 
which time he could order his judges to resolve the harm suffered by the 
 23. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 24. See infra Parts II.C., III.D. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 5148. 
 26. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *254-55.  Some may argue that this 
phrase could be interpreted to mean that a remedy must exist against the sovereign, 
because it would be a “wrong” for a harm to go unremedied.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 n.1 (2001).  Others argue that 
English sovereign immunity was more focused on the method of obtaining redress of 
injuries than an absolute prohibition on redress itself.  E.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the 
Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 542 (2003). 
 27. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *254-55. 
 28. Id. at *255. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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aggrieved subject.32  This practice grew into the common law rule that a 
sovereign may not be sued without its consent.33
B. Incorporation in American Law 
American law incorporates certain principles of sovereign immunity.34  
The government has replaced the King as sovereign and may not be sued 
without its own consent.35  This immunity extends to federal agencies.36  
The federal and state governments can consent to suit through statutes 
enacted by their respective legislatures.37  Consent to suit is also referred 
to as a waiver of sovereign immunity.38  Waiver of the government’s 
sovereign immunity operates very narrowly: the waiver must be 
“unequivocally expressed” in the statutory language,39 courts construe a 
waiver of sovereign immunity strictly in favor of the government,40 and 
courts will not enlarge the waiver beyond the requirements of the 
statutory language.41
 32. Id.  Blackstone’s Commentaries view the King as a benevolent person for 
whom “[t]o know of an injury and to redress it are inseparable. . . .”  Id. 
 33. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); see also Douglas 
Kahle, Note, United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.: “Unequivocal,” Yet Unwarranted, 
Support for Sovereign Immunity, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 325, 326-27 (1994). 
 34. Sovereign immunity in the United States was initially a result of the judicial 
conclusion that Article III was subject to common law, relying primarily on statements 
made in the Federalist Papers and the ratification debates.  See Susan Randall, Sovereign 
Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (2002).  The first Supreme 
Court opinion addressing the issue held that sovereign immunity had not been 
transplanted from English common law.  See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 
471-72 (1793).  The Court abandoned this position by 1834 and held that the doctrine 
protected the federal government from civil liability.  See Mark C. Niles, “Nothing But 
Mischief”: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1289 (2002). 
 35. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586 (“[T]he terms of [the United States’] consent to be sued 
in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”). 
 36. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (citing Fed. Hous. Admin. 
v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940)). 
 37. Waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity thus requires an act of 
Congress.  See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 515 (1940). 
 38. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737 (1999). 
 39. See Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586; see also United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 
486, 489 (1878) (describing the “basis of universal consent and recognition” as attributes 
of sovereignty that the federal government possesses, and that justify the unequivocal 
expression requirement). 
 40. E.g., United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992); United 
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992). 
 41. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979).  The Court in 
Kubrick stated, “we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that 




The doctrine of sovereign immunity creates tension between several 
important policies.  Sovereign immunity is said to promote government 
efficiency.42  Eliminating suits leaves the government free and unfettered 
in the pursuit of its official business,43 and avoids frivolous litigation.44  
On the other hand, eliminating suits impedes the democratic notion that 
the government and governmental officials should be held accountable 
for their decisions.45  The threat of damages creates an incentive for the 
government to comply with the law.46  Sovereign immunity may therefore 
lead to a lower quality of government decisionmaking and reduced 
accountability. 
Sovereign immunity also operates to protect the public treasury; permitting 
lawsuits against the government could lead to a raid on the treasury with 
the costs passed along to the taxpaying public.47  This goal also results in 
undesirable outcomes.  Instead of distributing the costs of improper 
governmental action equally among the taxpayers, the injured individual 
bears the entire loss.48  Additionally, sovereign immunity shifts claims 
for money damages to individual officers whom the doctrine does not 
protect.49 
Separation of powers, including principles of judicial restraint, provides a 
final justification for sovereign immunity.50  This justification contradicts 
which Congress intended.”  Id.  In the event the Court construes the waiver too narrowly, 
the Court leaves to Congress the option of extending the waiver further.  Id. at 125. 
 42. See Randall, supra note 34, at 100-01. 
 43. See, e.g., Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1214 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 44. See Chemerinksy, supra note 26, at 1219 (noting the claim implicit in 
arguments supporting sovereign immunity that adequate alternatives obviate the need for 
governmental liability); cf. infra, Part V.A. (examining the likelihood and desirability of 
a victim compensation fund as an alternative to liability). 
 45. See Randall, supra note 34, at 100-01; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 
1214. 
 46. Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1214. 
 47. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999): 
Not only must a State defend or default but also it must face the prospect of 
being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into the disfavored status of a 
debtor, subject to the power of private citizens to levy on its treasury or 
perhaps even government buildings or property which the State administers on 
the public’s behalf. 
Id. at 749.  Professor Chemerinsky criticizes the Court’s statement in Alden as elevating 
fiscal concerns over the need for governmental accountability.  Chemerinsky, supra note 
26, at 1217. 
 48. Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1217. 
 49. See id. at 1218-19. 
 50. “The interference of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of 
the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but 
mischief . . . .”  Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 
(1949), superceded in part by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 702, Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392 
(quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840)); accord Littell v. 
Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1214 (1971) (“The rationale for sovereign immunity essentially 
boils down to substantial bothersome interference with the operation of government.”).  
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the judiciary’s role in holding the other branches accountable for their 
actions.51  Furthermore, separation of powers does not operate to insulate 
the activities of the government from judicial review.52
Sovereign immunity may also be challenged on constitutional and 
historical grounds.53  Sovereign immunity arguably violates the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution by allowing a common law doctrine to trump 
the Constitution and federal law.54  One may also question whether the 
Founders intended to maintain this vestige of the government they had 
just overthrown, and they may have understood ratification of the 
Constitution to provide the consent necessary to waive sovereign 
immunity on the part of the States.55  These criticisms have led some to 
advocate the total abolishment of sovereign immunity, though others 
recognize that the doctrine is too firmly entrenched to eliminate.56
C.  The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Discretionary                        
Function Exception 
In the mid-twentieth century, Congress exercised its prerogative to 
waive sovereign immunity and permitted citizens to sue the federal 
government.57  The Federal Tort Claims Act58 (FTCA) allowed suits 
against the government in situations where a private individual would be 
This defense has also been described as a fear of replacing the democratic process with 
“government through litigation.”  Niles, supra note 34, at 1312. 
 51. See Jackson, supra note 26, at 573 (stating that a principal argument in favor of 
an independent judiciary is its ability to hold government accountable and render 
impartial justice between the government and the people). 
 52. See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1218. 
 53. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 34, at 1 (attacking the historical basis for 
sovereign immunity and suggesting that prudential doctrines can sufficiently protect 
separation of powers).  See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 26 (arguing that 
sovereign immunity cannot be justified on either originalist or non-originalist grounds). 
 54. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1211-12. 
 55. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 34, at 26, 31. 
 56. Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1224 (predicting that the Court will 
abolish sovereign immunity), with Randall, supra note 34, at 104 (suggesting prudential 
doctrines such as political question, common law duty, and discretionary function 
exceptions can sufficiently ensure separation of powers).  Professor Jackson suggests the 
courts originally invoked sovereign immunity in part to sustain judicial independence.  
Jackson, supra note 26, at 608.  She notes that because defiance of judgments has 
diminished, the doctrine should not restrain courts from providing remedies to address 
violations of legal rights.  Id. at 609. 
 57. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41. 
 58. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 




liable for similar actions.59  Certain exceptions apply, including claims 
for punitive damages.60  More importantly, the FTCA retains immunity for 
acts of government employees in the execution of statutes or regulations, 
and for acts based on the exercise of a discretionary function.61
Congress went through several drafts of the FTCA before settling on 
the final language of the discretionary function exception.  Attempts to 
enunciate the degree to which the FTCA retained sovereign immunity 
covered a wide range of possible language.  One draft of the FTCA did 
not enumerate an exception at all, assuming that courts would recognize 
the bill did not extend to discretionary administrative actions.62  Other 
proposals exempted specific spheres of federal activity from liability, 
such as postal service.63  The final version of the FTCA presented the 
discretionary function exception as a clarifying amendment to assure 
protection against tort liability for errors in administration or in the 
exercise of discretionary functions.64
Even with explicit language, judicial interpretation of the discretionary 
function exception has followed a tortuous path. The first case involving 
 59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).  The FTCA was not the first legislative 
waiver of sovereign immunity.  The Tucker Act, enacted in 1887, waived sovereign 
immunity for claims against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, any 
act of Congress, any regulation of an executive department, any express or implied 
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not 
sounding in tort.  Tucker Act, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (1887) (current version at 
28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000)).  The FTCA added to these statutes by allowing suits alleging 
tort liability on the part of the government.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 
 60. “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title 
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual 
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for 
punitive damages.”  28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has 
interpreted “punitive damages” to mean the recovery amount legally considered 
“punitive damages” under traditional common law principles.  See Molzof v. United 
States, 502 U.S. 301, 312 (1992).  The Court in Molzof rejected the argument that § 2674 
bars recovery for any damages beyond the plaintiff’s actual loss.  Id. at 306. 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000). 
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply 
to—(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the 
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, 
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise 
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or 
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, 
whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 
Id. 
 62. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26 (1953). 
 63. Id.  Other protected spheres included the activities of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the collection of taxes.  Id.  The final version of the 
discretionary function exception retained specific protections for postal service, tax and 
customs, imposition of a quarantine, the fiscal operations of the Treasury Department 
and certain banks, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Panama Canal Company.  28 
U.S.C. § 2680(b)-(n) (2000). 
 64. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 26-27. 
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the discretionary function exception failed to clarify the exception’s 
scope and created a “quagmire” of amorphous distinctions.65  The Court 
later clarified the policies behind the exception but still failed to 
enunciate a workable approach.66  After forty years of judicial floundering, 
the courts created and proceeded to refine a two-part test, which now 
governs the discretionary function exception. 
1.  The Quagmire of Early Doctrine 
The Supreme Court first addressed the discretionary function exception in 
Dalehite v. United States.67  Two ships docked in Texas City, Texas, 
caught fire, and exploded, leveling much of the city and killing many 
people.68  The ships carried ammonium nitrate, a substance long used as 
a component in explosives.69  Plaintiffs alleged negligence on the part of 
the federal government for shipping such cargo to a congested area 
without warning of the possibility of explosion.70
In a narrow decision,71 Dalehite held the negligence alleged fell within 
the discretionary function exception.72  The Court focused its discussion 
of the exception on whether the acts were of a governmental nature or 
function, but it shed little insight on the scope of the exception.73  The 
 65. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955); see also 
Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Judicial Interpretation of the Discretionary 
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REV. 365, 367 (1995) 
(characterizing the guidance Dalehite provided for other cases as “somewhat muddled”). 
 66. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984); see also Zillman, supra 
note 65, at 370. 
 67. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
 68. Id. at 23.  The explosion resulted in 8500 plaintiffs seeking $200 million in 
damages.  Zillman, supra note 65, at 368. 
 69. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 21.  Timothy McVeigh used ammonium nitrate in the in 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.  See Scientist Details Oklahoma City Bomb Residue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at A20.  Federal officials and employees were involved in a 
program to produce fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (FGAN) as part of the post-World 
War II effort to stabilize the agricultural economies of Germany, Japan, and Korea.  John 
W. Bagby & Gary L. Gittings, The Elusive Discretionary Function Exception from 
Government Tort Liability: The Narrowing Scope of Federal Liability, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 
223, 226 (1992). 
 70. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 23. 
 71. Dalehite was decided four-to-three, with Justices Douglas and Clark not 
participating in the decision.  Id. at 45. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 36.  The Court reasoned that because the FTCA only provides for 
liability in situations where a private person would be liable, the FTCA did not apply to 
uniquely governmental functions in which a private person could not engage.  Id. at 27-
28. 




Court viewed the exception broadly, such that any decision which 
originated at the executive level remained shielded from liability.74  The 
dissenting opinion applied the governmental/non-governmental function 
analysis but argued that the case involved actions akin to those of a 
private manufacturer, contractor, or shipper.75  Later cases criticized the 
governmental/non-governmental distinction as a “quagmire.”76
Nearly thirty years after Dalehite, the scope of the discretionary 
function exception remained undefined.77  In United States v. Varig 
Airlines,78 the Court continued an expansive view of the levels at which 
policymaking occurred, which prevented it from describing the outer 
limits of the exception.  The Court enunciated some of the policies 
furthered by the exception, but the test it promulgated provided little 
guidance to future cases.79
The Varig Court characterized the exception as an attempt to prevent 
judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions 
through the medium of tort actions.80  In other words, Congress created 
the discretionary function exception to promote governmental efficiency.81  
 74. “It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations 
of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.”  Id. at 36.  
The broad view of the exception illustrated in Dalehite nearly reached the traditional 
limits on government liability.  See Niles, supra note 34, at 1318. 
 75. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 60 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  The dissent reasoned that 
“[t]he Government, as landowner, as manufacturer, as shipper, as warehouseman, as 
shipowner and operator, is carrying on activities indistinguishable from those performed 
by private persons.”  Id.  The balancing of considerations by officials was no different 
than the balancing which citizens do “at their peril.”  Id.  The Dalehite decision would 
likely have come out differently today; “the handling techniques used and [ammonium 
nitrate’s] storage near other explosives would probably be classified outside the policy 
making realm.”  See Bagby & Gittings, supra note 69, at 228. 
 76. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955).  The Court in 
Indian Towing characterized the distinction as an “irreconcilable conflict” that “plagued 
the law of municipal corporations,” and was rendered unnecessary by the FTCA.  Id. 
 77. No clear description of the scope of the FTCA discretionary function exception 
emerged from the cases decided in the period between Dalehite and Varig.  In fact, some 
cases seemed to point in different directions, prompting the Varig Court to admit that the 
Supreme Court’s reading of the FTCA had “not followed a straight line. . . .”  United 
States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 811 (1984); see also Zillman, supra note 65, at 
369 (noting that lower federal courts between 1953 and 1984 applied the discretionary 
function exception by interpreting the language of Dalehite). 
 78. 467 U.S. 797 (1984). 
 79. Plaintiffs in Varig alleged negligence on the part of the Civil Aeronautics 
Agency, a predecessor of the Federal Aviation Administration, in inspecting and issuing 
a certificate to an aircraft that did not comply with fire safety requirements.  Id. at 800-
01.  A fire broke out in one of the aircraft lavatories.  The smoke filled the cabin and 
cockpit, and “124 of the 135 persons on board died from asphyxiation or the effects of 
toxic gases produced by the fire.”  Id. 
 80. Id. at 814.  This statement reflects separation of powers concerns and fear of 
“government through litigation.”  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 81. Varig, 467 U.S. at 814. 
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The Court attempted to isolate factors describing the reach of the 
discretionary function exception.  While those factors were of little use, 
they helped set the stage for a more workable approach by describing the 
purpose behind the exception.82
2. Berkovitz: A Two-Part Test Emerges 
A few years later, the Court clarified and expanded on Varig to create 
a more workable approach to the discretionary function exception.  In 
Berkovitz v. United States,83 Justice Marshall enunciated the first version 
of the two-part test for determining application of the exception.  First, a 
court must consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the 
governmental employee.84  The exception will not apply if the relevant 
federal statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a specific course of 
action.85  Second, if the challenged conduct does involve an element of 
judgment, that judgment must be of the type the exception was designed 
to shield.86
The Court summarized the discretionary function exception as 
insulating the government from liability “if the action challenged in the 
case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment.”87  In order 
for the exception to apply, the government must prove that the decision 
 82. The “factors” identified in Varig were hardly factors at all.  All that one can 
glean from the Varig opinion is that the discretionary function exception protects acts 
that Congress intended to shield, and that the exception encompasses the discretionary 
acts of the Government acting in its role as regulator of the conduct of private 
individuals.  See id. at 813-14.  Finding that both of these “factors” existed, the Court 
held the discretionary function exception barred plaintiffs’ claims.  Id. at 821. 
 83. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).  Plaintiffs in Berkovitz alleged wrongful approval and 
release of a polio vaccine which, rather than vaccinating their child, caused him to 
contract the disease.  Id. at 533. 
 84. Id. at 536. 
 85. Id.  The Court found that the discretionary function exception did not bar 
plaintiffs’ allegation that the vaccine was wrongly approved and licensed because the 
statute and regulations at issue required that the agency receive certain test data as a 
precondition to licensing.  Id. at 542-43.  The agency had no discretion to approve and 
license the vaccine without first receiving the test data.  Id. 
 86. Id. at 536-37.  The Court noted in dicta that the discretionary function 
exception would bar claims challenging the agency’s policy formulations of the 
appropriate way to regulate the release of vaccines.  Id. at 546.  The Court noted that the 
regulatory scheme governing release of vaccines was substantially similar to the 
certification process discussed in Varig.  Id. 
 87. Id. at 537. 




involved an element of judgment, and that the judgment was based on 
considerations of public policy.88
Cases after Berkovitz further developed the two-part test and broadened 
the protection offered by the discretionary function exception.  The Court in 
United States v. Gaubert89 created a “strong presumption” that an act 
authorized by a regulation involves considerations of policy if the regulation 
allows the employee discretion.90  Additionally, the first prong of the test 
now includes examination of whether a statutory duty provides a “fixed or 
readily ascertainable standard” to guide a government official in performing 
those duties.91  A statute or regulation meets this standard if it “mandates 
that a government agent perform his or her function in a specific manner.”92
III.  FEDERAL DISASTER RELIEF LEGISLATION 
Before examining the details of the Katrina response, it is important to 
provide a basic overview of the primary source of federal disaster 
assistance.  Centralized federal disaster relief legislation began with the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950.93  Revisions to that act culminated with the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Stafford Act).94  The 
Stafford Act improved upon earlier disaster relief legislation and 
expanded the federal role in disaster relief. 
This Part reviews previous disaster relief legislation and describes 
provisions of the Stafford Act particularly relevant to a claim Hurricane 
Katrina victims might bring against the federal government for inadequate 
supplies of food commodities.95  It also discusses a provision of the Stafford 
Act similar to the discretionary function exception of the FTCA.96
A.  Early Disaster Relief 
Congress passed the first federal disaster relief act in 1950.97  The 
primary purpose of the bill was to provide a general congressional policy 
with respect to federal disaster relief.98  The Disaster Relief Act of 1950 
 88. Id. 
 89. 499 U.S. 315 (1991). 
 90. Id. at 324.  For a discussion of the extent to which this presumption broadens 
the reach of the discretionary function exception, see Niles, supra note 34, at 1328-34. 
 91. Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 92. Id. at 1124-25. 
 93. Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109. 
 94. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2000). 
 95. Id. § 5180.  This Comment also refers to § 5151 of the Stafford Act, which 
requires nondiscrimination in disaster assistance.  See infra notes 127, 183. 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 5148. 
 97. Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109. 
 98. § 1; 96 CONG. REC. 11896 (1950) (statements of Rep. Whittington). 
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(DRA) authorized the President to coordinate all governmental agencies 
in major disasters.99  The DRA established a fund enabling the government 
to give direct relief to disaster areas when disasters arose, rather than 
requiring Congress to respond to each situation individually.100
Prior to the DRA, Congress would appropriate varying amounts on an 
ad hoc basis in response to particular disasters.101  The DRA intended to 
centralize funding and create a more systematic approach to disaster 
relief.102  In subsequent years, Congress revised and expanded upon the 
DRA in 1966,103 1969,104 and 1970.105
B. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974 
The 1970 Act was frequently used and sometimes criticized during the 
three years of its existence.106  In 1973, the Senate Subcommittee on 
 99. § 5(a), 64 Stat. at 1110 (“In the interest of providing maximum mobilization of 
Federal assistance under this Act, the President is authorized to coordinate in such 
manner as he may determine the activities of Federal agencies in providing disaster 
assistance”); 96 CONG. REC. 11895 (1950) (statements of Rep. Cox). 
 100. The 1950 DRA established a fund of $5 million.  § 8, 64 Stat. at 1111.  From 
1803 to 1947, Congress enacted approximately 128 specific relief acts.  See PETER J. 
MAY, RECOVERING FROM CATASTROPHES 20 (1985). 
 101. RUTH M. STRATTON, DISASTER RELIEF 31 (1989).  The prevailing view was 
that disaster relief was a state and local responsibility.  Id.  For an overview of late 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century disaster relief appropriations, see Michele Landis 
Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387 (2005).  Cf. Howard Gillman, 
Disaster Relief, “Do Anything” Spending Powers, and the New Deal, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 
443 (2005) (questioning Dauber’s claim that constitutional issues related to disaster relief 
offered a significant foundation for New Deal legislation); see also Michele L. Landis, “Let 
Me Next Time Be ‘Tried By Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare 
State, 1789-1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967 (1998) (arguing the origin of the American welfare 
state lies in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century disputes over disaster relief). 
 102. See MAY, supra note 100, at 23.  May characterizes pre-1950 disaster policy as 
“distributing relief assistance in a pork-barrel fashion.”  Id.  at 21. 
 103. Disaster Relief Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-769, 80 Stat. 1316.  The 1966 Act 
made amendments to the 1950 Act extending disaster-specific provisions.  MAY, supra 
note 100, at 24.  Notable provisions of the 1966 Act made rural communities eligible for 
assistance and provided funding for damage to higher education facilities and for repair 
of public facilities under construction.  Id. 
 104. Disaster Relief Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-79, 83 Stat. 125.  The 1969 Act 
was limited to fifteen months in duration.  MAY, supra note 100, at 24. 
 105. Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744.  The 1970 Act 
was an outgrowth of the Hurricane Camile response and included most provisions of the 
expiring 1969 Act, with an emphasis on expanding relief assistance for individuals.  
MAY, supra note 100, at 25. 
 106. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 1 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 
3070.  Under the 1970 Act, the President declared 111 major disasters in forty-one different 
states.  Id. 




Disaster Relief held field hearings in four cities that suffered severe 
losses in major disasters.107  This investigation resulted in the Stafford 
Act.108  The Stafford Act retained the basic pattern of public and private 
assistance seen in the 1970 Act.109  It refined the 1970 Act by modifying 
its provisions in response to changing conditions and resources.110
The Stafford Act covers a broad range of topics: disaster preparedness 
and mitigation assistance,111 major disaster and emergency assistance 
administration,112 and major disaster assistance programs.113  The 
Stafford Act aimed to increase the ability of the federal government to 
respond effectively and to expedite long-range recovery operations.114  
Congress intended “to provide an orderly and continuing means of 
assistance by the Federal Government to state and local governments in 
carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate [disaster-related] suffering 
and damage. . . .”115
 107. The hearings took place in Biloxi, MS (following Hurricane Camile), Rapid 
City, SD (flooding), Wilkes-Barre, PA (Hurricane Agnes), and Elmira, NY (Hurricane 
Agnes).  See 120 CONG. REC. 10509, 10510 (1974).  At the time, Hurricane Agnes was 
the worst disaster in U.S. history, causing $3.5 billion in storm damage (in 1972 dollars) 
and 122 deaths.  Bartlett C. Hagemeyer & Scott M. Spratt, Thirty Years After Hurricane 
Agnes: The Forgotten Florida Tornado Disaster, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mlb/agnes30. 
html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). 
 108. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 
(2000); see also S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 3 (1974). 
 109. Both the 1970 and Stafford Acts authorized the President to provide disaster 
preparation assistance to local and state governments.  See Disaster Relief Act of 1970 
§§ 206(a), (b); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5131(a), (b).  Both Acts also allowed for a federal role in 
providing temporary housing and rental assistance to private individuals.  See Disaster 
Relief Act of 1970 § 226; 42 U.S.C. § 5174. 
 110. The previous disaster relief acts created a pattern of expanded benefits, 
resulting in forty-eight disaster declarations and an expenditure of $713,889,127 from 
the Disaster Fund in 1972.  STRATTON, supra note 101, at 45.  The Nixon administration 
sought to transfer direct management of disaster programs back to the state governments, 
in keeping with the “New Federalism” approach of the early Nixon years, but Congress 
rejected the proposal.  Id.  The philosophical issues surrounding the appropriate scope 
and amount of federal disaster assistance remain debatable subjects.  See MAY, supra 
note 100, at 40.  May notes that every disaster act beginning with the 1950 DRA 
explicitly stated that federal relief was “supplemental” to state and local relief efforts, but 
what that means in terms of state and federal responsibilities has been unclear.  Id. at 26. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5131-34. 
 112. Id. §§ 5141-65(c). 
 113. Id. §§ 5170-97. Major disaster assistance programs include emergency 
assistance programs and emergency preparedness.  See id. §§ 5191-93, 5195-97(h). 
 114. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 22 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 
3090. 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (2000).  The 1970 Act contained identical language.  
Disaster Relief Act of 1970 § 101(b), Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744.  The 1970 and 
Stafford Acts emerged from an era of congressional generosity toward disaster victims, 
and thus expanded federal disaster assistance beyond the limits of prior disaster relief 
acts.  See STRATTON, supra note 101, at 45-47. 
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To trigger the assistance of the federal government, the Governor of 
the affected state must request one of two declarations by the President.116  
The Governor may request either a “major disaster” declaration or an 
“emergency” declaration.117  This two-tiered system represents one of 
the changes the Stafford Act made to the system of disaster relief; 
previous disaster relief acts only provided for a declaration of a major 
disaster.118  The distinction created under the Stafford Act allows the 
federal government to extend help during emergencies that do not rise to 
the level of a “major disaster.”119  Once the Governor submits her request, 
the President then decides what declaration to make, if any, in response 
to the request.120 
If the President grants the request, the Associate Director of the 
Readiness, Response, and Recovery Directorate designates both the 
types of assistance available and the areas eligible for assistance.121  The 
FEMA Director then notifies the Governor of this designation.122  The 
FEMA Director also appoints a Federal Coordinating Officer who is 
charged with ensuring that federal assistance is provided.123
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (“Based on the request of a Governor under this section, the 
President may declare under this chapter that a major disaster or emergency exists.”).  
For further explanation of the declaration process and available assistance, see FEMA, A 
Guide to the Disaster Declaration Process and Federal Disaster Assistance, available at 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rebuild/recover/dec_proc.pdf. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 5170. 
 118. See, e.g., Disaster Relief Act of 1970 § 102(1); Disaster Relief Act of 1966, 
Pub. L. No. 89-769, § 2, 80 Stat. 1316 (repealed 1970). 
 119. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 3, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 3072.  
Technical assistance, advisory personnel, equipment, food, other supplies, personnel, 
medical care, and other essentials are provided in an emergency declaration.  44 C.F.R. § 
206.62 (2005).  Assistance authorized by an emergency declaration is limited to 
immediate and short-term aid.  Id. § 206.63.  Other benefits, such as loan assistance, are 
not provided unless the President declares a major disaster.  See id. § 206.361. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 5170.  Whether a governor requests a major disaster or emergency 
declaration, the President may always deny the request.  44 C.F.R. § 206.38 (2005).  If a 
governor requests a major disaster declaration, the President may choose to make an 
emergency declaration instead of granting or denying the request outright.  Id. 
 121. 44 C.F.R. § 206.40(a)-(b) (2005). 
 122. See id. § 206.39(c).  The notification comes from either the director of the 
regional FEMA office or the associate director of the Readiness, Response and Recovery 
Directorate.  Id. §§ 206.2, 206.39(c). 
 123. Id. § 206.41(a). 




C.  Food Commodities and the Stafford Act 
The provision of the Stafford Act particularly pertinent to this 
discussion describes the federal government’s role in providing food 
commodities to disaster victims.124  Section 5180 provides a basis for 
Hurricane Katrina victims’ claims if it can be shown to fall outside of 
the discretionary function exception.125
The Stafford Act expanded the federal role in providing food 
commodities to disaster victims.126  Section 5180 assigns responsibility 
to the President to prepare for emergency mass feeding or distribution of 
food in any area suffering a major disaster or emergency.127  The 
Secretary of Agriculture is to use funds to purchase any necessary food 
supplies.128
Section 5180 was one of the more significant amendments proposed 
by the Stafford Act.129  The 1950 and 1966 Disaster Acts did not contain 
any provisions regarding food commodities.130  The 1969 and 1970 Acts 
 124. 42 U.S.C. § 5180(a) (2000) (“The President is authorized and directed to 
assure that adequate stocks of food will be ready and conveniently available for 
emergency mass feeding or distribution in any area of the United States which suffers a 
major disaster or emergency.”). 
 125. Hurricane Katrina victims might also base a claim on Stafford Act § 5151, 
which prohibits discrimination in disaster assistance.  Section 5151 states: 
The President shall issue, and may alter or amend, such regulations as may be 
necessary for the guidance of personnel carrying out Federal assistance 
functions at the site of a major disaster or emergency. Such regulations shall 
include provisions for insuring that the distribution of supplies, the processing 
of applications, and other relief and assistance activities shall be accomplished 
in an equitable and impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of 
race, color, religion, nationality, sex, age, or economic status. 
42 U.S.C. § 5151(a).  The import of § 5151 is unclear.  On the one hand, § 5151 seems to 
incorporate into the Stafford Act certain protections afforded under the Constitution.  
E.g., The Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  By that reading, § 5151 
adds little to the Stafford Act.  On the other hand, § 5151 might be read to go further 
than the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as it prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
economic status. 
 126. See STRATTON, supra note 101, at 47. 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 5180(a). 
 128. Id. § 5180(b) (“The Secretary of Agriculture shall utilize funds appropriated 
under section 612c of title 7, to purchase food commodities necessary to provide 
adequate supplies for use in any area of the United States in the event of a major disaster 
or emergency in such area.”).  Section 612c of Title 7 establishes a fund to which 30% of 
gross receipts from duties collected under customs laws.  See 7 U.S.C. § 612c (2000) 
(amended 2002).  Money from the fund may be used to encourage the exportation or 
domestic consumption of agricultural commodities, and to reestablish farmers’ 
purchasing power.  See id. 
 129. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 1-2 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 
3070-71. 
 130. See Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109; Disaster 
Relief Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-769, § 2, 80 Stat. 1316 (repealed 1970).  The 1970 
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authorized the President to distribute food coupons and surplus 
commodities but left distribution to his discretion.131  A “lack of surplus 
commodities . . . raised questions about [the government’s] ability to 
provide sufficient supplies for mass feeding and for home use after 
major disasters.”132  The drafters of the Stafford Act noted the essential 
nature of food stuffs following a disaster,133 and believed § 5180 “clearly 
delineate[s]” federal responsibilities in the areas of food assistance and 
mass feeding.134
Section 5180 has not garnered much attention from courts or executive 
agencies.  No case law exists interpreting the food commodities provision.  
Regulations promulgated under the Stafford Act repeat the main 
statutory language and delegate responsibility to the Associate Director 
for Homeland Security.135  Despite the scarcity of judicial or administrative 
materials interpreting § 5180, established methods of statutory interpretation 
reveal a few key features of the provision.  The plain language of the 
statute, applicable canons of construction, and the legislative history of 
the Stafford Act all support the conclusion that § 5180 places a 
mandatory duty on the President to provide adequate food to disaster 
victims. 
Unlike many portions of the Stafford Act, the statutory language of    
§ 5180 is mandatory in nature.136  The President is “directed” to assure 
and Stafford Acts, in comparison, were more generous and extensive, and provided more 
benefits to victims of catastrophes.  See STRATTON, supra note 101, at 47. 
 131. Disaster Relief Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-79, § 11(a), 83 Stat. 125, 129; 
Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-606, § 238(a), 84 Stat. 1744, 1755 (repealed 
1974). 
 132. S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 7, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 3076.  The 
decision to replace the USDA family food distribution program with food stamps 
exacerbated these concerns.  Id. 
 133. 120 CONG. REC. 10509, 10511 (1974) (“Use of surplus food stuffs for mass 
feeding . . . is especially essential . . . after a . . . catastrophe when thousands may be 
dislocated and the normal economy has seriously disrupted.”) (statement of Sen. 
Burdick); see also S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 7, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3070, 
3076. 
 134. 120 CONG. REC. 10509, 10513 (1974) (“Sections 409 and 410 clearly delineate 
federal responsibilities in the areas of food assistance and mass feeding.  These are areas 
in which the impending lapse of certain legislative authorities could have resulted in 
insurmountable administrative problems.”) (statement of Sen. Domincini). 
 135. 44 C.F.R. § 206.151(a) (2005) (“The Associate Director will assure that 
adequate stocks of food will be ready and conveniently available for emergency mass 
feeding or distribution in any area of the United States which suffers a major disaster or 
emergency.”). 
 136. Most substantive provisions of the Stafford Act contain permissive language 
such as “may” or “is authorized to.”  See, e.g., Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act of 




availability of food supplies, and the Secretary “shall” utilize funds to 
purchase such supplies.137  Turning first to the plain meaning of the 
words, we see that the President is given authority to provide food 
commodities and also commanded to use that authority.138  The term 
directed should be interpreted separately, in order to avoid surplusage.139  
To read § 5180 as anything other than a mandatory command would 
render directed meaningless.140  Section 5180 must therefore be read as 
giving the President authority to make food commodities available, and 
making exercise of that authority mandatory. 
On the other hand, canons of construction are not mandatory rules and 
do not foreclose alternative readings.141 One can frequently point to 
opposing canons with respect to the same principle of statutory 
construction.142  For example, plain language may not be given effect if 
literal interpretation would lead to absurd consequences, and words 
inadvertently inserted or repugnant to the rest of the statutes may be 
rejected as surplusage.143  Thus, the conclusion that § 5180 prescribes a 
1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5152 (2000) (authorizing the President to enter into agreements with 
disaster assistance organizations); id. § 5170a (“In any major disaster, the President 
may . . . .”  (emphasis added)); id. § 5173 (authorizing the President to clear debris 
“whenever he determines it to be in the public interest”).  Mandatory language is more 
common in procedural provisions.  See, e.g., id. § 5156 (“The President shall establish 
comprehensive standards [for] assess[ing] . . . efficiency and effectiveness . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); id. § 5143 (“[T]he President shall appoint a Federal coordinating 
officer to operate in the affected area.” (emphasis added)). 
 137. Id. § 5180. 
 138. “The President is authorized and directed . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 139. “It is, moreover, ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute 
ought . . . to be so construed that . . . no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, 
void, or insignificant.’”  Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 489 
n.13 (2004) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)); see also HENRY 
CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE 
LAWS 165-67 (2d ed., 1911). 
 140. Cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004) 
(“[Respondent’s] reading would render part of the statute entirely superfluous, 
something we are loath to do.”). 
 141. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001).  The Court in 
Chickasaw Nation addressed a conflict between competing canons of construction: one 
assumes statutes should be interpreted to benefit Native American tribes, but another 
warns against interpreting statutes as providing tax exemptions.  See id. at 95.  The Court 
concluded that the only reasonable reading of the statute at issue required it to reject 
certain language as surplusage.  Id. at 86. 
 142. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960).  
Professor Llewellyn juxtaposes competing constructions as “thrust[s]” and “parr[ies]” in 
argument.  Id. at 522-28. 
 143. Id. at 524, 525.  Justice Scalia criticizes several of Llewellyn’s thrust/parry 
dichotomies as lacking proper support.  See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 25-26 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); cf. Richard A. Posner, Statutory 
Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 805 
(1983) (noting the gap between scholarly criticism of the canons and their practical use 
in judicial opinions). 
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mandatory course of action should not rest on canons of construction 
alone. 
The legislative history of the Stafford Act supports an interpretation of 
§ 5180 as mandatory.  The 1970 Disaster Relief Act gave the President 
authority to distribute food coupons and surplus food stuffs but left the 
exercise of that authority to his discretion.144  Congress believed that      
§ 5180 was one of the significant improvements on the 1970 Act,145 and 
that its language clearly delineated federal responsibility vis-à-vis feeding 
disaster victims.146  Because Congress intended § 5180 to require more 
of the President than the 1970 Act, the mandatory language of the 
section should not be discarded and ignored.  Rather, § 5180 should be 
read in a manner consistent with its plain language, recognized canons of 
construction, and the legislative history of the Stafford Act. 
D.  The Stafford Act and the Discretionary Function Exception 
Stafford Act § 5148 contains a discretionary function exception similar to 
that of the FTCA.147  Understanding the Stafford Act discretionary 
function exception is necessary before examining the claims Hurricane 
Katrina victims can bring against the federal government.  Judicial 
interpretation of the Stafford Act discretionary function exception has 
followed a path similar to that of the FTCA discretionary function 
exception.  Early decisions did not result in a clear rule or reason, but 
recent cases utilize the two-part test promulgated in Berkovitz.148
Recognizing the similarity between the FTCA and Stafford Act 
discretionary function exceptions, a majority of courts apply the FTCA 
 144. See Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, § 238(a), 84 Stat. 1744, 
1755. 
 145. See S. REP. NO. 93-778, at 2, 7-8 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3070, 3071. 
 146. See supra note 134. 
 147. The Stafford Act discretionary function exception states: 
The Federal Government shall not be liable for any claim based upon the 
exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Federal 
Government in carrying out the provisions of this chapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2000).  This language parallels that of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) 
(exempting discretionary functions from the FTCA general waiver of sovereign 
immunity).  The Stafford Act discretionary function exception has been part of federal 
disaster legislation since the 1950 Act.  See Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-
875, § 3, 64 Stat. 1109. 1110. 
 148. See, e.g., Dureiko v. United States, 209 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 




two-part test to determine whether § 5148 applies in claims arising from 
disaster relief.149  The exception shields from review determinations of 
eligibility for disaster relief and benefits,150 decisions regarding funding,151 
and certain decisions regarding debris removal.152  The exception does 
not bar claims of negligent operation of a vehicle by a government 
employee,153 nor does it apply to funding decisions when specific award 
conditions have been set.154
The first case to address the discretionary function exception of the 
Stafford Act involved an effort to recover Emergency Feed Program 
disaster assistance payments.155  The court in Ornellas v. United States 
held that the discretionary function provision precluded liability for any 
actions or inactions involving disaster relief.156  The court deemed 
disaster assistance a “gratuity,” and held that liability should not be 
imposed for discretionary acts under gratuitous programs.157  The court 
also found support for this view in the Stafford Act’s legislative 
history.158
 149. See, e.g., id. at 1351, 1353; Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park v. Phillips & 
Jordan, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 283, 285 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
 150. See City of San Bruno v. FEMA, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
 151. See Burgos-Montes v. Municipality of Yauco, 294 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.P.R. 
2003); California-Nevada Methodist Homes, Inc. v. FEMA, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001). 
 152. See Sunrise Village, 960 F. Supp. at 286 (involving cleanup efforts in the wake 
of Hurricane Andrew). 
 153. See Torres v. United States, 979 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (D.V.I. 1997) (holding 
the exception inapplicable notwithstanding fact that the government employee was 
driving between FEMA sites). 
 154. See Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 155. Ornellas v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 378, 379 (1983).  The Emergency Feed 
Program was initially implemented under the provisions of the Stafford Act, and was 
subsequently replaced by a similar program under the Food and Agricultural Act.  Id. at 
379 n.1.  Under this program, farmers could receive disaster payments for the cost of 
cattle feed.  Id. at 378.  The Food and Agriculture Act did not contain a discretionary 
function exception.  Id. at 379 n.1.  The court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the latter 
act should govern because: (1) the eligibility regulations were in effect at the time of 
plaintiffs’ applications; and (2) the applications were submitted before the Food and 
Agricultural Act took effect.  Id. 
 156. Id. at 379. 
 157. Id. at 380 (citing D.R. Smalley & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 372 F.2d 505, 
507-08 (Cl. Ct. 1967)). 
 158. Id.  The court relied on the following statement as evidence of Congress’s 
intent to bar all claims regarding disaster relief: 
We have further provided that if the agencies of the Government make a 
mistake in the administration of the Disaster Relief Act that the Government 
may not be sued.  Strange as it may seem, there are many suits pending in the 
Court of Claims today against the Government because of alleged mistakes 
made in the administration of other relief acts, suits . . . because citizens have 
averred that the agencies and employees of Government made mistakes.  We 
have put a stipulation in here that there shall be no liability on the part of the 
Government. 
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Ornellas reached the correct result, but through a misguided interpretation 
of § 5148.  The court erroneously interpreted § 5148 as barring all claims 
arising from disaster relief.159  This approach read the word discretionary 
out of the statute.  If all disaster relief is discretionary, the word 
discretionary becomes mere surplusage.160  The presence of the word 
discretionary infers that some acts of the federal government in 
providing disaster relief are non-discretionary.161  There is no need to 
resort to legislative history if a statute is plain on its face.162  Finally, the 
notion that the federal government should not be liable for “gratuitous” 
programs has little judicial authority163 and invites the same sort of 
quagmire as the governmental/non-governmental distinction that arose 
from early FTCA cases.164
The Ornellas court reached the correct decision despite its faulty 
reasoning.  Although the Stafford Act does not bar all claims arising 
from disaster relief, determinations of eligibility under the Emergency 
Feed Program are discretionary functions under the two-part test.  In 
the absence of clear and mandatory guidelines, determinations of 
eligibility for disaster relief and benefits involve policy judgments.165  
Id. (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 11895, 11912 (1950) (statement of Rep. Whittington)).  The 
statement came from debates regarding the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, in which the 
discretionary function exception first appeared.  See Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. 
No. 81-875, § 3, 64 Stat. 1109, 1110.  The court took this statement to mean Congress 
intended to raise a statutory barrier to all judicial review.  Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380. 
 159. Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380. 
 160. Canons of construction require courts to give effect whenever possible to every 
word of the written law.  See BLACK, supra note 139, at 165-67. 
 161. The statements from legislative history similarly render the term discretionary 
meaningless.  It appears that the Ornellas court relied on the following statement from 
legislative history: “We have put a stipulation in here that there will be no liability on the 
part of the Government.”  See Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380 (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 11895, 
11912). 
 162. See Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 392, 397 n.3 
(1998).  While current Justices may differ as to the usefulness of legislative history, none 
contend it should prevail over the statutory language when a conflict exists between the 
two.  Compare SCALIA, supra note 143, at 17 (“It is the law that governs, not the intent of 
the lawgiver.”), with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 866 (1992) (“I do not see how one can criticize courts 
that use legislative history on conceptual grounds.”). 
 163. The authority upon which Ornellas relied in classifying emergency assistance 
as a gratuity involved highway construction, not disaster assistance, and was decided on 
the bases of contract and agency theories.  Ornellas, 2 Cl. Ct. at 380 (citing D.R. Smalley 
& Sons, Inc. v. United States, 372 F.2d 505, 507-08 (Cl. Ct. 1967)). 
 164. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955). 
 165. See City of San Bruno v. FEMA, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(applying the exception to a determination that the city was ineligible for disaster relief 




Administrators must allocate finite resources based on disaster victims’ 
relative needs.166  Eligibility decisions thus meet the first prong of the 
Berkovitz test because they involve an element of judgment or choice.167  
The administrative decisions at issue in Ornellas would therefore be 
shielded from review by reason of their discretionary nature.168
Not all actions undertaken by the federal government in providing 
disaster relief are discretionary.169  In Dureiko v. United States,170 the court 
applied the two-part discretionary function test to a breach of contract 
claim.171  There, FEMA sought sites where it could place temporary 
housing and operate its relief efforts.172  Dureiko agreed to lease sites to 
FEMA, but only after allegedly requiring a list of assurances.173  He then 
sued the United States and its subcontractors for allegedly failing to 
follow the agreed-upon procedures in conducting its cleanup efforts.174
The Dureiko court held that the discretionary function exception did 
not bar the plaintiff’s contract claim.175  Although FEMA’s initial decision 
to contract with the plaintiff involved an element of judgment or choice; 
its subsequent compliance with the contract did not.176  The court found 
following the collapse of a hillside); cf. Graham v. FEMA, 149 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 
1998) (finding the exception did not apply to eligibility determinations when regulations 
established objective requirements of the award conditions). 
 166. See Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“[D]ecisions involving the allocation and deployment of limited governmental resources 
are the type of administrative judgment that the discretionary function exception was 
designed to immunize from suit.”). 
 167. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). 
 168. See California-Nevada Methodist Homes, Inc. v. FEMA, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1202 
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding the exception applied to denial of requested disaster relief 
funds); City of San Bruno, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16.  In defense of the Ornellas 
decision, it should be noted that the Berkovitz two-part test had not yet been 
promulgated. 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.  Additionally, the discretionary 
function exception does not bar constitutional claims.  Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 
1008 (11th Cir. 1987); accord Lockett v. FEMA, 836 F. Supp. 847, 854 (S.D. Fla. 1993).  
Adherence to constitutional guidelines is mandatory, not discretionary.  Rosas, 826 F.2d 
at 1008.  Plaintiff in Rosas v. Brock challenged a regulation defining “unemployed 
worker” in disaster areas, arguing that the definition violated constitutional, statutory, 
and regulatory provisions.  Id. at 1006-07.  The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of 
plaintiff’s statutory and regulatory claims, but reversed the district court’s dismissal of 
his constitutional claim.  Id. at 1010.  The court found no reason to believe Congress 
intended to grant agencies discretion to act unconstitutionally.  Id. at 1008. 
 170. 209 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1348.  Dureiko operated a mobile home park in Dade County, Florida.  
Id.  FEMA personnel were in the area in response to Hurricane Andrew.  Id. 
 173. Id.  Dureiko claimed to have witnessed damage to other mobile home parks at 
the hands of government cleanup contractors, and thus demanded assurances.  Id. 
 174. Id. at 1352. 
 175. Id. at 1352-53. 
 176. Id. at 1353.  The court noted that the government’s position would allow it to 
avoid paying contractors for their cleanup efforts.  Id. 
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the contract was indistinguishable from a statute or regulation dictating a 
specific course of conduct for an employee to follow.177  FEMA and its 
subcontractors had no choice but to comply with the terms of the alleged 
contract; there was no discretion for the exception to protect.178
IV. HURRICANE KATRINA: CAUSE OF ACTION? 
The federal response to Hurricane Katrina was admittedly inadequate.179  
Whether the response gives rise to any liability is a separate question.  
This Part examines the litigation prospects for complaints filed by 
Hurricane Katrina victims based on the food commodities provision of 
the Stafford Act.  Claims based on the food commodities provision must 
first overcome the discretionary function exception.180  The following 
analysis explains why claims focusing on the inadequate quantity of 
food supplies, rather than the inconvenient availability of such supplies, 
are more likely to survive a motion to dismiss. 
Section 5180 requires the President to assure adequate supplies of 
food are ready and conveniently available for disaster victims.181  When 
Hurricane Katrina hit on Monday, August 29, close to 100,000 New 
Orleans residents remained in the city.182  The number of people requiring 
food was both expected and predictable.  One hundred thousand people 
remained in New Orleans after the evacuation order, a figure in line with 
pre-disaster scenarios and predictions, including the 2004 Hurricane 
 177. Id.  The court noted that under both a contract and a regulation or statute, “the 
employee has no rightful option but to adhere to [its] directive[s].”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Bush Admits Katrina Response Was Inadequate, supra note 15. 
 180. Claims based on the nondiscrimination provision, on the other hand, need not 
address the discretionary function exception because compliance with constitutional 
principles is never discretionary.  See Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir. 
1987).  Black or African-Americans constitute 67.3% of the New Orleans population, 
and over one-quarter of the population live below the poverty line, according to the 2000 
census.  U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 5.  These statistics suggest that the federal 
response had a disparate impact on minority and low-income citizens, in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 5151 (2000).  Alleging a violation of § 5151 would help insulate Hurricane 
Katrina victims’ complaints from a motion to dismiss.  A claim based on § 5151 would 
ensure the litigation continued even if the court determined that the discretionary 
function exception barred other claims they raised. 
 181. For a discussion of § 5180, see supra Part III.C. 
 182. Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1. 




Pam exercise.183  One in five of New Orleans’s 480,000 residents did not 
have a car184 and thus faced great difficulty in evacuating. 
Despite this knowledge, the federal government was slow to respond.  
“[There was] no evidence that food and water supplies were formally 
ordered for the Convention Center, where more than 10,000 evacuees 
had assembled, until days after the city had decided to open it as a 
backup emergency shelter.”185  Federally supplied food provisions did 
not mobilize until Wednesday,186 and the Superdome, a designated refuge, 
ran out of food and water on Friday.187
The discretionary function exception may nonetheless provide a 
powerful defense for the government.  If the exception applies to § 5180, 
food-related litigation will terminate on a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.188  A court will therefore examine § 5180 
under the two-part test to determine whether it shields the government 
from liability.189
A court must first determine whether the action is a matter of choice 
for the relevant government employee.190  The plain language and 
legislative history of § 5180 reveal that the duty to provide adequate 
food is mandatory, and canons of construction support this interpretation.191  
Even if an official duty is mandatory, the discretionary function exception 
will apply if the statute or regulation in question does not provide a 
“fixed or readily ascertainable standard” for performing the duty.192  The 
exception might therefore be said to apply to § 5180 because neither the 
statute nor the applicable regulations define precisely what constitutes 
 183. The Hurricane Pam exercise used realistic weather and damage information to 
help officials develop response plans for a catastrophic hurricane in Louisiana.  FEMA, 
Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema? 
id=13051 (last visited July 16, 2006).  According to the Hurricane Pam scenario, only 
one-third of New Orleans residents would evacuate prior to the storm’s arrival.  Times-
Picayune, In Case of Emergency, http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/newsrelated/incase 
ofemrgencyexercise.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). 
 184. Evan Thomas, The Lost City, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42-52. 
 185. Lipton, Levee’s Failure, supra note 3, at A1.  Although FEMA planned to 
have 360,000 ready-to-eat meals and fifteen trucks of water delivered to the city in 
advance of the storm, only 40,000 meals and five trucks arrived.  Id. 
 186. The government dispatched 400 trucks, carrying 5.4 million meals.  Evan 
Thomas, How Bush Blew It, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 33. 
 187. Lipton et al., Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1. 
 188. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).  Rule 12(b)(1) is not the only mechanism by 
which a party may challenge subject matter jurisdiction, but it is the earliest opportunity 
to do so.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (allowing parties to challenge subject matter 
jurisdiction at any time). 
 189. The development and operation of the two-part test is described supra, Part 
II.C.2. 
 190. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39. 
 192. See Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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“adequate” food supplies.193  This argument fails, however, because any 
interpretation of “adequate” perforce involves an amount proportionate 
to the number of victims predicted to remain behind.194
Under the second part of the test, the court examines whether the 
judgment is of the kind the discretionary function exception was designed 
to shield.195  The exception, as a retention of sovereign immunity, is designed 
to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative 
decisions.196  This characterization of the discretionary function exception 
reflects a concern for separation of powers and an aversion to “government 
through litigation.”197
In this case, a court need not engage in judicial second-guessing to 
find that the federal government failed in its duty to provide adequate 
food.  The Hurricane Pam exercise and other pre-disaster scenarios 
provide sufficient objective information to evaluate the government’s 
response.198  Therefore, a court would not need to substitute its judgment 
for that of the executive branch.  Moreover, separation of powers does 
not insulate the decisions of the coequal branches of government from 
judicial review,199 and litigation provides a mechanism for government 
accountability.200  Assuming a court proceeds to the second part of the 
Berkovitz test, it should find the discretionary function exception is not 
designed to shield decisions regarding “adequate” food for Hurricane 
Katrina victims predicted to remain in New Orleans. 
The discretionary function exception will more likely bar claims 
alleging violation of the “conveniently available” provision of § 5180.  
 193. For the full text of § 5180(a) and 44 C.F.R. § 206.151(a), see supra notes 124, 
135. 
 194. The American Heritage Dictionary defines adequate as: “1. Sufficient to 
satisfy a requirement or meet a need. . . .  2. Barely satisfactory or sufficient: The 
skater’s technique was only adequate.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 25 (4th ed. 2000).
 195. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37; see also Dureiko v. United States, 209 F.3d 
1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  A court turns to the second part of the Berkovitz test only if 
it finds the decision involved an element of judgment.  Nonetheless, the test is examined 
here. 
 196. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 
(1949); see also Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1214 (4th Cir. 1971) (characterizing 
the policy of Larson as avoiding “substantial bothersome interference with the operation 
of government). 
 197. See Niles, supra note 34, at 1312. 
 198. See Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes, supra note 183; see also Lipton et al., 
Hurricane to Anarchy, supra note 3, at A1. 
 199. See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1218. 
 200. See Jackson, supra note 26, at 573. 




“[D]ecisions involving the allocation and deployment of limited 
governmental resources are the type of administrative judgment that 
the . . . exception was designed to immunize from suit.”201  Thus, if FEMA 
officials decided to establish a food distribution center at the Superdome 
instead of the Convention Center, that decision would be properly 
protected by the discretionary function exception. 
Although food was unavailable at both the Superdome and Convention 
Center, this is more reflective of a failure to provide adequate supply 
than to make food conveniently available.  Moreover, judicial review of 
the convenient availability of food commodities does raise legitimate 
concerns of judicial second-guessing and micromanagement of executive 
agencies.  Therefore, Hurricane Katrina victims would do well to focus 
their § 5180 claims on the adequacy of food commodities, not the 
location at which they were or were not distributed. 
To illustrate this point further, consider the court’s decision in 
Dureiko.  Recall the court’s holding that while FEMA’s initial decision 
to enter into a contract was discretionary, its acts pursuant to the contract 
were mandatory.202  A contrary interpretation would allow FEMA to 
avoid having to pay contractors for cleanup efforts.203  Section 5180 
requires similar, but inverted, reasoning.  The initial decision of whether 
or not to send food to a disaster area is mandatory, but decisions of 
where and how to distribute the food require discretion.  To interpret the 
adequacy provision of § 5180 otherwise would allow the President to 
send no food at all and then claim the protection of the discretionary 
function exception. 
Thus, by focusing on the inadequate quantity of food supplied by the 
federal government, Hurricane Katrina victims maximize their chances 
of surviving a motion to dismiss based on the discretionary function 
exception.  Assuming that claims based on § 5180 are legally sufficient, 
we turn to potential vehicles for recovery. 
V. VEHICLES FOR RECOVERY 
Having discussed the basis for claims Hurricane Katrina victims might 
bring against the federal government, focus now shifts to the vehicles for 
recovery that might be available.  Two vehicles are discussed in this 
Part: a victim compensation fund along the lines of the September 11th 
fund, and a class action lawsuit.  After assessing the relative merits of 
each, it concludes that a class action provides the best vehicle for recovery. 
 201. See Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 202. Dureiko v. United States, 209 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 203. Id. at 1353-54. 
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A.  Victim Compensation Fund 
One potential vehicle for recovery would be a victim compensation 
fund modeled after the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 
2001 (the Fund).204  The Fund represented a novel approach to post-
catastrophe relief by establishing an alternative to recovery through 
traditional tort remedies.  Although the tort option was not foreclosed for 
the victims of September 11th, Congress provided incentives that would 
channel claims into the no-fault compensation scheme established by the 
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.205  “[C]laimants 
eligible under the Fund are put to a choice—they must elect either to 
claim benefits under the Fund or to waive their rights [to Fund benefits] 
and pursue a tort claim.”206  Tort remained available as an option for 
those who fell outside the eligibility limits.207
A Hurricane Katrina victim compensation fund (VCF) would provide 
two main improvements on traditional tort recovery.  First, it would 
avoid the delays and expense of protracted litigation.  Resources and 
energies that would otherwise go to pursuing and defending claims could 
be put to more socially beneficial uses, such as rebuilding the Gulf Coast 
region.  Second, a VCF would minimize the government’s potential 
liability to Hurricane Katrina victims.  A VCF provides incentives for 
Hurricane Katrina victims to accept the benefits offered and forego tort 
claims; the government could thus capitalize its outlays to victims, rather 
than face uncertainty as to the amounts that presumably sympathetic 
juries may award.  In addition to these benefits, a VCF also provides a 
mechanism for the government to compensate victims more quickly than 
would tort litigation.208 
Benefits notwithstanding, a VCF is unlikely to materialize.  First, 
unlike the World Trade Center attacks of September 11th, a hurricane 
 204. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2003)). 
 205. Id. § 405(b)(2); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, Procedure, and 
Justice: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 460-
64 (2003) (noting such aspects of the VCF as prompt payment, nonadversarial 
proceedings, and the ability to obtain a preliminary estimate of recovery). 
 206. Rabin, supra note 22, at 785. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Cf. John Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1027, 1035-36 (2003) (observing the promptness with which the Air Transportation 
Safety and Stabilization Act, and the VCF in particular, were created and passed). 




striking the Gulf Coast region was not unprecedented.209  Although 
Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude distinguished it from average storms 
witnessed during hurricane season, it did not engender the reaction that 
characterized the days and weeks immediately following September 
11th.  There was certainly an outpouring of support to Hurricane Katrina 
victims, but there was not the sense, as existed following September 
11th, that all Americans had suffered losses.210  This might be traced in 
part to the relative unforeseeability of the September 11th attacks and in 
part to the distinction between man-made disasters and natural disasters.211
Second, political pressures for rapid recovery are not as strong with 
regard to Hurricane Katrina as existed for the victims of September 11th.  
“A long and bitter contest over liability [for September 11th victims] . . . 
almost certainly would have been regarded as intolerable to the national 
community.”212  While many Americans believe the federal government 
responded inadequately to Hurricane Katrina, the sense that immediate 
recovery is essential does not exist.  Third, the insolvency concerns that 
prompted creation of the Fund are absent with respect to Hurricane 
Katrina.  It is likely that mass tort claims in the wake of September 11th 
would have thrown major players in the airline industry into bankruptcy.213  
No analogous private industry exists in the Hurricane Katrina scenario to 
provide similar pressures for a no-fault alternative to tort liability. 
Moreover, general criticisms of VCFs apply here as well.214  First, the 
premise on which a VCF rests is uncertain: Should payments from the 
Fund be based primarily on the unmet needs of the victim, taking into 
account collateral sources of recovery such as insurance, or should they 
seek individualized justice without regard for collateral sources?215  
 209. See Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes, supra note 183. 
 210. See Rabin, supra note 22, at 772 (stating that case-by-case contests over tort 
claims do not carry the emotional resonance and national empathy generated toward the 
victims of September 11th). 
 211. For a discussion of how notions of fault, blame, and compensation have 
changed with respect to natural and man-made disasters, see generally Lawrence M. 
Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total Justice: Responses to Man-
Made Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251 (2003) (surveying over one hundred years of disasters). 
 212. Rabin, supra note 22, at 771. 
 213. See id. (asserting that insolvency concerns, more than any other single factor, 
explain Congress’s speed in setting up the Fund). 
 214. Some criticisms include: treating married and unmarried people differently, 
providing no compensation to people whose injuries will manifest themselves later, and 
homogenizing noneconomic loss claims.  See Culhane, supra note 208, at 1052.  
Professor Culhane argues that deeper philosophical objections surround the very 
existence of the Fund, as well as its operation.  Id. 
 215. See David Y. Stevens, Note, Tort Liability After the Dust Settles: An Economic 
Analysis of the Airline Defendants’ Duty to Ground Victims in the September 11 
Litigation, 80 IND. L.J. 545, 561-62 (2005) (discussing “secondary cost reductions” in 
compensating victims). 
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Additionally, payments from a VCF raise difficult issues of line drawing: 
How can the system make principled distinctions between victims’ 
situations without creating arbitrary categories?216  Finally, there is the 
question of the precedent a Hurricane Katrina victim compensation fund 
would set for future natural disasters.  Continuing a VCF model in the 
future would increase costs of disaster relief and disregard the traditional 
principle that liability does not attend to “acts of God.”217  On the other 
hand, if the Hurricane Katrina VCF was a one-time-only response, we 
risk violating the principle of similar treatment should the government 
respond inadequately to some future disaster. 
Despite a VCF’s benefits and appeal, inadequate institutional 
pressures exist to encourage the federal government to establish one.  
Additionally, the uncertain principles upon which a VCF rests raise valid 
objections to its existence in the first place.   
B.  Class Action 
A second potential vehicle for recovery is a certified class action.  
Class actions carry their own unique benefits and burdens.  Although a 
mass tort class action would be difficult to maintain, it nonetheless 
appears to be the preferred vehicle for Hurricane Katrina victims to 
recover for their losses.218
1. Benefits and Problems of Class Actions 
Class actions rose to prominence in the 1970s as a particular form of 
joinder device.219  They were initially trumpeted as a means for the 
common person to seek remedies from powerful defendants against 
whom less powerful plaintiffs would have little chance of success in 
 216. See Culhane, supra note 208, at 1052. 
 217. See, e.g., Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1550, 
1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (“A party may be deemed negligent yet still be exonerated from 
liability if the act of God would have produced the same damage irrespective of the 
party’s negligence.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 451 (1965) (defining 
an intervening “extraordinary force of nature”). 
 218. Mass tort class actions seeking monetary recovery proceed under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 
 219. Interestingly, the Advisory Committee to the 1966 Amendments to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) believed the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) rendered 
class actions inappropriate for “mass accident” litigation.  Mary J. Davis, Toward the 
Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 171-72 (1998). 




conventional litigation.220  While this Comment is not intended as a 
treatise on class actions, a cursory review of the benefits of class actions 
is in order.  First, class actions allow recovery for persons who might 
otherwise have remained ignorant of their injury or the possibility of 
recovery.221  Second, class actions are more economically feasible for 
aggrieved parties insofar as class action plaintiffs can share the cost of 
retaining counsel and other litigation expenses.222  Third, class actions 
provide an incentive to litigate collectively where no such incentive 
might exist individually.223  A common example is a scenario in which a 
large number of plaintiffs suffered minor losses; their collective loss 
provides an incentive to sue, whereas their individual losses would 
not.224  Finally, class actions provide a method of fair allocation of resources.  
All class members share the amount awarded, and any settlement or 
compromise requires court approval.225 
Class action lawsuits contain their own unique problems.  First, class 
members exercise little control over the litigation.226  This is the trade-
off resulting from collective representation and the incentives to litigate 
collectively.227  Second, the res judicata effects of class actions bar 
future claims from members of the class.228  Finally, aggregated claims 
 220. In the words of Justice Douglas, “Some of these [class action plaintiffs] are 
consumers whose claims may seem de minimis but who alone have no practical recourse 
for either remuneration or injunctive relief. . . .  The class action is one of the few legal 
remedies the small claimant has against those who command the status quo.”  Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185-86 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 221. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring that Rule 23(b)(3) class members 
receive notice of, inter alia, the nature of the action and the issues involved); see also 
ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY 
LITIGATION 377-78 (2000) (describing such requirements as “essential due process 
elements for binding absent class members.”). 
 222. 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 5:18 
(4th ed. 2002). 
 223. Id. § 5:7. 
 224. See Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 21, 22 (1996).  Professor Fiss offers a price-fixing agreement in small 
transactions as an illustration of this concept; the damage to an individual investor may 
be only seventy dollars, but the damage inflicted on all investors reaches the millions.  
Id. 
 225. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); see also Manuel L. Real, What Evil Have We 
Wrought: Class Action, Mass Torts, and Settlement, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 442 
(1998) (“This rule is the foundation for much of the judge’s power to persuade and 
facilitate fairness in settlement.”). 
 226. See KLONOFF & BILICH, supra note 221, at 2 (“How can a court ensure that 
class action dismissals and settlements do not end up benefiting counsel and defendants 
at the expense of the class members?”). 
 227. Cf. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reporting From the Front Line—One Mediator’s 
Experience With Mass Torts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 370 (1998) (noting the 
impracticability for a mass tort class action lawyer to communicate with each and every 
client). 
 228. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 222, §§ 5:36, 5:38. 
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create a strong incentive to sue, thus increasing the risk of frivolous 
lawsuits.  229
2. Weighing Benefits and Problems for Hurricane Katrina Victims 
The benefits of a class action are present to different degrees for 
Hurricane Katrina victims.  Hurricane Katrina victims are likely aware 
of their injury—lack of food during the disaster—but may be unaware of 
the possibility of recovery from the federal government.  The economic 
efficiency of pursuing a class action and the incentive it creates to 
litigate are also significant benefits due to the socioeconomic status of 
the average victim who remained behind.230  The degree to which class 
action provides a fair allocation of resources is less clear for Hurricane 
Katrina victims.  For one thing, it raises a question similar to those 
regarding a victim compensation fund: Short of dividing the recovery 
amount equally among all members, how would the class determine 
which members should receive what amount?231
The problems attending class actions are also unique with respect to 
Hurricane Katrina victims.  As mentioned, a lesser degree of control over 
the litigation necessarily follows the benefits of collective representation 
and litigation.   The res judicata effect of the class action is less 
problematic for a mass tort case because class members would be 
provided an opportunity to “opt out” of the litigation and pursue their 
claims individually.   Given the particular fact scenario involved with 
Hurricane Katrina, it may also be safely assumed that the class action 
would be meritorious rather than frivolous 
232
233
litigation.   Additionally, the 
government’s protection under the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
facilitates dismissal of frivolous claims against it.
234
235 
 229. See Davis, supra note 219, at 187 (“Much of the recent criticism of class 
actions . . . stems from the ‘blackmail settlement’ aspect of class actions, especially those 
certified for settlement only and not for litigation.”). 
 230. Recall that over one-quarter of New Orleans’s population live below the 
poverty line.  See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 5. 
 231. See Culhane, supra note 208, at 1052 (discussing limitations of the VCF); see 
also Feinberg, supra note 227 (noting, with respect to mass tort settlements, the 
difficulty of determining each class member’s individual award). 
 232. See supra text accompanying note 227. 
 233. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 234. See supra text accompanying notes 182-87. 
 235. For a full discussion of sovereign immunity, see supra Part II. 




On balance, a Rule 23(b)(3) certified class action appears to be the 
best vehicle for recovery available to Hurricane Katrina victims.  A class 
action retains most features of traditional tort litigation, such as the 
plaintiff’s burden of proving all elements of their claim, but the high cost 
of litigation can be shared among members of the class.  A class action 
also represents the best option for balancing the competing interests 
underlying the doctrine of sovereign immunity.236  By allocating to 
Hurricane Katrina victims the burden of proving their claims, class 
action litigation protects against raids on the treasury to a greater extent 
than a VCF.237  Should their claims prove meritorious, the class action 
vehicle provides a channel by which the federal government may be held 
accountable for its failure to provide adequate food supplies.238 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf coast region.  This Comment 
contends that citizens of New Orleans for whom the federal government 
failed to provide adequate food supplies have a cause of action against 
the federal government.  The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as reflected in 
the discretionary function exception, should not bar Hurricane Katrina 
victims’ claims because the duty to provide adequate food supplies is a 
non-discretionary duty.  A class action lawsuit provides the best vehicle 
for recovery and best balances the competing policies underlying the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Federal disaster relief has improved dramatically over the past fifty 
years.  Under the Stafford Act, the federal government provides a range 
of disaster relief from temporary housing to unemployment assistance.  
While these federal programs are commendable, the government must 
still be held accountable for its failings.  When a statute provides a clear 
directive to the federal government, like the directive of § 5180 of the 
Stafford Act, the discretionary function exception should not apply.  
Victims of the government’s failure to carry out that directive should 
have their day in court. 
NATHAN SMITH 
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 42-56. 
 237. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (raising fiscal concerns regarding 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). 
 238. See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1217 (arguing that the need for 
governmental accountability outweighs fiscal concerns). 
